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CORPORATIONS-ALLOCATION OF SUBSIDIARY'S TAX BENEFIT FROM
CoNSOLIDATED RETURN-Defendant parent corporation received from its
subsidiary 3,556,992 dollars in tax benefits which had accrued to the subsidiary from filing a consolidated income tax return.1 By agreement between
parent and subsidiary, the profit-making corporation was to pay the losing
corporation the savings created by the consolidated return. The working
relationship of the two assured the subsidiary profits and the parent losses.2
Consequently, nearly all tax benefit inevitably flowed to the parent.8
Plaintiffs, the subsidiary's minority stockholders, sought a refunding of
benefits allocated to defendant, claiming that the agreement was unfair and
alleging that the defendant, as the subsidiary's majority shareholder, had
violated its fiduciary obligation to minority shareholders. The Supreme
Court, finding no violation, dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the
Appellate Division, held, reversed. The subsidiary's majority shareholder
owes its minority shareholders a fiduciary duty not to part with all or
nearly all the tax benefit resulting from a consolidated return; since the
agreement between the parent (majority shareholder) and the subsidiary
violates this obligation, the allocation agreement is unenforceable. Case v.
New York Cent. R.R., 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963).
The consolidated return permits a group of corporations to be taxed
on their consolidated taxable income, thereby representing only the results
of the operations of the group after eliminating inter-company profits
and losses. 4 A second important advantage is that a profit-making corporation's taxable income may be lessened by the amount of another corporation's losses, thereby reducing their combined tax liability. Section l.?52
of the Internal Revenue Code of 19545 offers several possible systems of
1 See !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1501-04. Section 1503(a) is the only section noted here
which was altered by the 1964 Revenue Act. The special 2% tax on corporations filing a
consolidated return was abolished. Revenue Act of 1964, § 234(a), 78 Stat. 19. Due to
§ 1503(a)(C), however, railroads were and have remained exempt from the 2% tax.
2 Parent was lessee of subsidiary's railroad. It paid all maintenance and operating
expenses of the railroad and in addition paid to the subsidiary 40% of gross earnings. The
court noted that subsidiary enjoyed a "practically guaranteed taxable income into the
indefinite future." Parent, on the other hand, could avail itself of not only its operating
losses, but also those of its other affiliates. The court gave no figures concerning parent's
losses, but it concluded that parent was assured of operating at a loss.
3 In actuality, the subsidiary allocated $3,556,992.15 to the parent from the total
savings of $3,825,717.43. The net saving remaining with the subsidiary was $268,725.28.
Eighty percent of that went to parent as stockholder, so that only $53,751.05, or less than
1.5% of the total savings, accrued to the minority shareholders.
4 BrrTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 67 (1959).
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1552. This section suggests four possible systems of tax
liability allocation among members of a group filing a consolidated return. The method
chosen in the first consolidated return filed must be followed in subsequent years. · ·
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allocating tax liability among the members, but suggests no method of tax
credit allocation. 6 Therefore, in the absence of agreement by the parties,
the corporation whose tax liability is reduced retains the savings. A
corporation with a wholly-owned subsidiary receives all the tax benefit
either directly, ff its liability is reduced, or indirectly, as the subsidiary's
sole stockholder, if the subsidiary's liability is diminished. However, when
the parent does not wholly own the subsidiary, and the subsidiary's tax
liability is lessened, the parent will normally share the savings with the
minority shareholders. The 1954 Code, by lowering the affiliation test for
consolidated returns from ninety-five to eighty percent ownership by a
common parent,7 enlarged the number of minority interests affected by
consolidated returns and increased benefit distribution problems.8 In
order to avoid sharing benefits with minority stockholders, parent corporations sometimes make allocation agreements with the subsidiaries which
provide for payment of the tax benefit to the parent. Since the parent
owns eighty percent or more of the voting stock of the subsidiary, minority
stockholders generally have no voice in deciding whether to file a consolidated return or in drafting the allocation agreement. Apprehension
that parents might violate their fiduciary duty while in such a dominant
position has caused several courts to scrutinize these agreements, holding
unenforceable those whose practical consequence channels all tax benefits
to the dominant corporation.9
Two attacks can be made on such agreements; both ultimately are
designed to test the equitability of the tax benefit allocation. First, payment
of the subsidiary's tax benefits to its majority shareholder may constitute
an illegal dividend. Second, the payment may violate the fiduciary duty
which the majority owe the minority stockholders. The initial premise of
the illegal dividend theory is the accepted principle that all stockholders
of the same class are entitled to share equally in profit distribution according to the number of shares held by each.10 Discriminatory dividends are
6 Justice Jackson, dissenting from the granting of a rehearing in Western Pac. R.R.
v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 277 (1953), asserted that the legislative intent was to
provide salvage for the losing corporation and not profit for a corporation sustaining no
loss.
7 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1504. The previous requirement of 95% ownership is found
in INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 14l(d).
8 See BITTKER, op. cit. supra 'note 4, at 69; CuDDIHY, Consolidated Returns, N.Y.U.
16TH INST. ON FED. TAX 351, 358 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1954).
The importance of the consolidated return is evident from these figures from the fiscal
year 1955-1956; although only 2,900 consolidated returns were filed, the tax liability of the
taxpayers involved was .$2.8 billion, almost 13% of the aggregate corporate tax liability
that year. BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 68.
9 See Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1962), afj'd, 149 So. 2d 45
(Fla. 1963); principal case at 387, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
10 E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483 (1918); Penfield v. Davis, 105 F. Supp.
292 (N.D. Ala. 1952), afj'd, 205 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1953); Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. v.
United States, 20 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Ky. 1937), appeal dismissed, 97 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir.
1938).
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illegal, rectifiable only by the unanimous consent of all shareholders.11
Consequently, if tax benefit payments are dividends, and the allocation
agreement transfers all tax savings to the majority stockholder parent, such
preferential treatment among stockhold,.ers of the same class renders the
distribution illegal.
The troublesome link in the argument is the contention that tax
benefit distributions are dividends. A dividend need not be formally
declared nor even called a dividend by those authorizing it.12 By analogizing from other distributions held to be dividends by various courts, it is
conceivable that tax benefit payments might also be identified as dividends.
In corporate law cases, courts have classified as dividends certain wages
and salaries, 13 loans to shareholders,14' and a payment by a corporation of
taxes on its stockholders' dividends.1 5 In tax cases courts are seemingly
even more involved with identifying spurious dividends. The Tax Court,
deciding a case factually similar to the principal case, held that for income
tax purposes an allocation to the parent of tax benefits received by subsidiary from a consolidated return is a dividend. 16 Analogically, support
has been given this holding by other courts, which have asserted that the
following are disguised dividends for tax purposes: profits accruing to a
shareholder from a theatre lease by the corporation to the shareholder at
a low rental,17 the sale of property by a corporation to a shareholder at a
price substantially below market value,18 and payment by the corporation
of premiums on a stockholder's life insurance policy. 19 The difficulty with
analogizing from tax cases is that even if a tax credit payment is a dividend
for tax purposes, it may not be a dividend for corporate law purposes.20
However, because courts deciding corporate cases have been willing to
disregard form and acknowledge various distributions as spurious dividends,
it seems apparent that, where justice requires, most profit distributions
classified as dividends for tax purposes could also be so identified for
11 Speier Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1935); Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank,
136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1962), afj'd, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963); Scott v. P. Lorillard Co.,
108 N.J. Eq. 153, 154 Atl. 515 (Ch. 1931); see 11 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5352
(perm ed. rev. repl. 1958).
12 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 239 (1946); 11 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 11,
§ 5350.
13 De Martini v. Scavenger's Protective Ass'n, 3 Cal. App. 691, 40 P.2d 317 (1935);
Prater v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 440, 288 S.W. 342 (1926); Shaw v. Ansaldi Co., 178 App.
Div. 589, 165 N.Y. Supp. 872 (1917).
14 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Becklenberg, 300 Ill. App. 453, 21 N.E.2d 152 (1939).
15 Redhead v. Iowa Nat'l Bank, 127 Iowa 572, 103 N.W. 796 (1905).
16 Beneficial Corp., 18 T.C. 396 (1952), afj'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
17 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952).
18 Elizabeth Susan Strake Trust, 1 T.C. 1131 (1943).
10 Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
20 See WARREN &: SURREY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 123 (1963), in which the authors
declare that a distribution may be a dividend for tax purposes although not a formal
dividend as far as state corporation law is concerned.
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corporate law purposes.21 To that extent, tax cases should have analogical
value. Drawing support from the ~pparent willingness of the courts,
evidenced in both corporate and tax law cases, to conceptualize profit
distributions as dividends, a court may maintain that tax benefit payments
are dividends when it believes the allocation agreement forced upon the
minority is inequitable. Therefore, an agreement to pay all of a corporation's tax benefit to a majority stockholder, being a discriminatory dividend,
would be unenforceable unless ratified by all shareholders. One state court
recently invalidated a distributive agreement on this ground.22
The alternative attack on allocation agreements alleges a violation
of the well-recognized fiduciary obligation which majority shareholders
owe the minority.23 Although majority stockholders rightfully control a
corporation, they may not use that power for their individual advantage.24
The fiduciary cannot escape his duties merely by contracting with the
controlled corporation, for self-serving contracts imposed by a majority
shareholder may be rescinded.25 However, a parent (the majority shareholder of its subsidiary) may deal with its affiliate for profit as long as
there is no overreaching or unfairness.26 Essentially, therefore, the legality
of an agreement between a parent and its subsidiary requiring the profitmaking corporation to pay the losing corporation those savings created by
the consolidated return, turns upon whether there is present the requisite
overreaching or unfairness constituting a breach of fiduciary duties.
The lower court, reversed in the principal case, asserted that inasmuch
as the subsidiary's directors need not act prophetically when formulating
the allocation agreement, the bare fact that subsequent to the agreement
the parent operated at a loss and the subsidiary at a profit is no reason to
conclude unfairness. 27 As the Appellate Division pointed out, however,
21 See cases cited notes 13-15 supra; BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note
FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 11, § 5350.
22 Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. App. 1962), aff'd,

12, § 239; 11

149 So. 2d 45
(Fla. 1963). This case is not to be confused with the Tax Court case cited in note 16 supra,
which held that for tax purposes an allocation to a parent of tax benefits received by a
subsidiary from a consolidated return is a dividend. The Florida case held the allocation
to be a dividend for corporate law purposes, requiring ratification by all shareholders
before being legal because of its discriminatory distribution.
23 E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483 (1918); Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Seventeen Stones Corp. v. General
Tel. Co., 204 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226
N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); see BERLE, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV,
L. REv. 1049 (1931).
24 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Seventeen Stones Corp. v. General Tel.
Co., supra note 23; Rank Organization Ltd. v. Pathe Labs., 33 Misc. 2d 748, 227 N.Y.S.2d
562 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., supra note 23.
25 Consol. Rock Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Ripley v. International Rys. of
Central America, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1962); see HENN,
CORPORATIONS § 241 (1961).
26 Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 197 F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1952), rehearing
denied, 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910 (1953).
27 Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 232 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd, principal
case.
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no element of prophecy was required to foresee that profits and losses were
going to fall as they did. Where it is legitimately questionable who will
benefit from the agreement, the lower court's argument appears sound.28
Nevertheless, because of a parent's dominance over its subsidiary, courts
probably will require clear evidence of the initial unpredictability as to
which party would benefit from the agreement if in fact the agreement
proves to be overwhelmingly in favor of the dominant party.
The dissent in the principal case reasoned that because minority shareholders were no worse off than before the consolidated return and allocation agreement-the money flowing to parent would have gone to the
Interna! Revenue had the parent-subsidiary agreement not been concluded
-there was no violation of the fiduciary duty owed them. In fact, the
minority received a small percentage of the tax savings. This argument,
however, seems fallacious, for there need not be an absolute dollar loss to
minority shareholders before the majority will be deemed to have breached
its duty. Tax savings constitute an increase in the subsidiary's net profits,
and by placing itself in a disproportionately advantageous position with
respect to allocation of the profits, the majority violated its fiduciary duty.211
Taking into consideration the percentage of total distributable income
allocated to minority stockholders, the loss was real and substantial. If the
creation of the tax benefit were totally attributable to the parent, such
savings would rightfully belong to it. As both majority and dissenting
opinions in the principal case attested, however, the parent and subsidiary
were both essential parties, each having something of value to contribute
to the realization of the tax credit. It would seem basically unfair in such a
situation to permit the accrual of all or nearly all the tax benefit to only
one party.
·
The court in the principal case did not suggest a proper distribution of
tax benefits. Finding the allocation agreement unenforceable, it returned
the savings to the initial beneficiary, the subsidiary. This solution did not
deprive the parent of a substantial share of the benefit, since eighty percent
would accrue to the parent as a stockholder of the subsidiary. Nevertheless,
according to such a distributive system, the parent is rewarded only as a
stockholder and not as an essential participant in the consolidated return.
It might be argued that the following is a more reasonable method of
tax benefit distribution. Since both parties are essential to create the tax
credit, it might be argued theoretically that since both the parent (losing
party) and the subsidiary (profit-making party) are equally valuable in
creating the tax benefit, each should receive fifty percent of the savings
28 See Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum&: Transport Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 304, 56 N.E.2d
705, 715 (1944); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232, 43 N.E.2d 19, 20 (1942); Costello v.
Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 262, 103 N.E. 148, 152 (1913).
29 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western
Pac. R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 1952), rehearing denied, 206 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910 (1953); Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d
850 (1951).
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for its part1C1pation in achieving the saving. Even with this allocation
based on the indispensability of the two corporations' participation in the
consolidated return, the parent would still have an eighty-percent stockholder's interest in the benefits accruing to its subsidiary.30 The result is
that the parent would have a ninety-percent interest in the savings and the
subsidiary's minority shareholders a ten-percent interest. A scheme which
deprives the subsidiary's minority stockholders of any right to the consolidated return benefits is obviously inequitable because the subsidiary
corporation is thus deprived of sharing in the tax savings it played an
essential role in creating. This was in essence the effect of the allocation
agreement in the principal case, which the court correctly held unenforceable. Courts may rely on the illegal dividend theory or find a violation of a
fiduciary obligation; but regardless of approach, they are not likely to
enforce allocation agreements which require all or nearly all tax savings of
subsidiaries to accrue to losing parent corporations.

Thomas B. Ridgley

30 See INT. REv. ConE oF 1954, § 1504.

